We defend the Simulation Theory of Mind against a challenge from the Theory Theory of Mind. The challenge is that while Simulation Theory can account for Theory of Mind errors, it cannot account for their systematic nature. There are Theory of Mind errors seen in social psychological research with adults where persons are either overly generous or overly cynical in how rational they expect others to be. There are also Theory of Mind errors observable in developmental data drawn from Maxi-type (...) false belief tests. We provide novel responses to several examples showing that Simulation Theory can answer these challenges. (shrink)

By employing the theoretical template provided by agency theory, this article contributes a detailed clinical analysis of a large multinational Canada-headquartered telecommunications company, Nortel. Our analysis reveals a twenty-first century norm of usual suspects: a CEO whose compensation is well above those of his peers, a dysfunctional board of directors, acts of income smoothing to preserve the confidence of volatile investors, and revelations of financial irregularities followed by a downfall. In many ways, the spectacular rise and – sudden – fall (...) of Nortel illustrates excesses of actors within, and contradictions of the system of corporate governance implied by the agency model. Furthermore, this case illustrates limitations of the agency framework in complex situations with short-term oriented investors. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 337 Quodlibetal Questions. By WILLIAM OF OcKHAM. Vol. 1 trans. Alfred J. Freddoso and Francis E. Kelley; vol. 2 trans. Alfred J. Freddoso ; pref. Norman Kretzmann. Vol. l of the Yale Library of Medieval Philosophy. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991. Pp. 391 and 305. $100.00 for both (cloth). In these handsome volumes, Professor Alfred J. Freddoso and the late Professor Frank E. Kelley (...) have provided the scholarly community with an English translation of William of Ockham's Quodlibeta septem (hereafter QS). The volumes constitute the first volume in the new Yale Library of Medieval Philosophy, and both the new series and this first contribution within it will add generously to the growing num· her of medieval philosophical texts available in English. Using the critical edition of Ockham's Latin text established by the Rev. Joseph C. Wey (Opera theologica, vol. 9, Franciscan Institute: St. Bonaventure, NY, 1980) as the basis for their work, the translators offer to readers of English an accurate translation of one of Ockham's mature theological works, treating a wide variety of philosophical and theological topics. Indeed, thanks to their efforts, the broad range of Ockham's thought in natural and revealed theology, ontology, epistemology, and ethics becomes available in English for the first time. The purpose of the Yale series is to translate into English " complete works of philosophical and historical importance". In deciding which work of Ockham to translate for the series, the translators faced two potential hazards: the danger of translating one of Ockham's earlier works that might contain ideas which he subsequently reconsidered; and the danger of translating a work that focused upon a narrow range of topics, something which would give readers the false impression that Ockham's philosophy was concerned only with those topics. The translators have adroitly managed to avoid both of these potential hazards. The translators certainly steered clear of the first hazard by deciding to translate Ockham's QS. These quodlibetal questions are believed to represent the substance of disputations Ockham held at the Franciscan studium in London during the years 1322-1324, although the final written form of the work probably was not established until 1325 or shortly thereafter at Avignon. Hence the QS represent to a large extent Ockham's final word on the topics discussed, since in the period after 1325 up until the time of his death in 1347 Ockham was too heavily embroiled in ecclesiological and political controversies in Avignon and Munich to give much consideration to more speculative concerns. Yet the translators also avoided the second hazard by choos- 338 BOOK REVIEWS ing to translate the QS. True, the QS is akin to numerous other medieval quodlibetal questions in that it treats an array of questions; hut, in the case of Ockham's work, the range of topics is so broad and the issues broached therein so fundamental to his personal thought that one has, in effect, a compendium of Ockham's major philosophical and theological ideas. A brief glance at the table of questions indicates the breadth of the questions and their relevance to perennial philosophical discussions. In the area of philosophical theology, Ockham asks whether it can be proved by natural reason that there is only one God; whether it can be proved by natural reason that God's power is infinite; whether God could have made the world from eternity. In regard to ethical theory, Ockham asks whether the exterior act has its own proper moral goodness, and whether there can be a demonstrative science about morals. In fields of epistemology and the philosophy of mind, Ockham asks whether the human intellect knows its own acts intuitively in this life; whether it knows sensible things intuitively; and whether there can be an intuitive cognition of a non-existent object. Closer to the area of logic and semantics, Ockham raises several questions about the status of propositions and their components: whether a mental proposition is composed of things or concepts; whether mental names are divided into concrete and abstract names in the manner of spoken names; whether the object of a definition is an extra-mental reality or a concept. Finally, readers... (shrink)

This book argues that ethical business behavior can be enhanced by taking fuller account of human nature, particularly with respect to the need for creating relatively small communities within the corporation. Timothy Fort discusses this premise in relation to the three predominant theories of business ethics--stakeholder, virtue, and contract. Drawing heavily from philosophy, he analyzes traditional business ethics and legal theory. Overall, his work provides a good example of how to integrate normative and empirical studies in business ethics, a (...) task that often receives substantial discussion in academic journals. (shrink)

Individuals frequently make use of the body and environment when engaged in a cognitive task. For example, individuals will often spontaneously physically rotate when faced with rotated objects, such as an array of words, to putatively offload the performance costs associated with stimulus rotation. We looked to further examine this idea by independently manipulating the costs associated with both word rotation and array frame rotation. Surprisingly, we found that individuals’ patterns of spontaneous physical rotations did not follow patterns of performance (...) costs or benefits associated with being physically rotated, findings difficult to reconcile with existing theories of strategy selection involving external resources. Individuals’ subjective ratings of perceived benefits, rather, provided an excellent match to the patterns of physical rotations, suggesting that the critical variable when deciding on-the-fly whether to incorporate an external resource is the participant's metacognitive beliefs regarding expected performance or the effort required for each approach. Implications for metacognition's future in theories of cognitive offloading are discussed. (shrink)

Santayana's later philosophical writings contain a critique of pragmatism and idealism which still has a little appreciated relevance as a critique of verificationist styles of thought which remain markedly influential. He urged that cognitive thought essentially consists in positing objects the existence of which cannot be verified except by other thoughts which likewise do no more than posit objects, and moreover that in a sense all such posited objects are substances lurking behind their various appearances. Granted that this is a (...) general truth about the objects of thought, one can never discredit the claim to know about objects of any particular type on the grounds that this truth applies to them, nor can it be thought a recommendation of some reductivist account of objects of a certain sort that it saves their existence from being unverifiable, for it will still leave the objects to which they are reduced in the same boat. The continuing relevance of Santayana's insight here is argued for. (shrink)

Originally published in 1988, this landmark study develops its own positive account of the nature and foundations of moral judgement, while at the same time serving as a guide to the range of views on the matter which have been given in modern western philosophy. The book addresses itself to two main questions: Can moral judgements be true or false in that fundamental sense in which a true proposition is one which describes things as they really are? Are rational methods (...) available in ethics which can be expected to produce convergence on shared moral views on the part of those who use them intelligently? (shrink)

This paper argues that business can be helpfully conceived of as a mediating institution. Drawing upon neo-conservative theology, the author argues that mediating institutions serve a vital function in a free society to provide social justice out of an expanded civil society and provide a framework for a flourishing free market. Such institutions also nourish the attitudinal orientation of solidarity in applying the principle of subsidiarity by which self-interest becomes fulfilled through concern for others.The author further argues that businesses also (...) be conceived of as mediating institutions and thereby be held to criteria of meeting associationalneeds. In addition to normative reasons for revising the social contract so that businesses do serve the role of mediating institutions, contemporary management theories demonstrate that businesses can also meet their social obligations of creating wealth while meeting associational needs. (shrink)

An Important distinction between statements of fact and statements of value is widely recognised. Some philosophers are now saying that the distinction has been treated as more determinate than it is, but most philosophers would agree that the distinction is definite and important. The major contributions to Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy of this century have set out to illuminate the nature of this distinction. Ethical statements have been thevalue statements mainly at issue, but on the whole the aim has not been (...) to show wherein they differ from other value statements, but to show what distinguishes them in common with other value statements from factual statements. The characterisations of ethical statements which have become famous areones which if they apply to ethical statements at all apply equally to many other value statements as well. (shrink)

This paper is a response to a recent colloquy among Professors David Messick, Donna Wold, and Edwin Harman. I defend Messick’s naturalist methodology, which suggests that people inherently categorize others and act altruistically toward certain people in a given person’s in-group. This paper suggests that an anthropological reason for this grouping tendency is a limited human neural ability to process large numbers of relationships. But because human beings also have the ability to modify, to some extent, their nature, corporate law (...) can organize small mediating institutions within large corporations in order to take ethical advantage of this groupingtendency. Within a corporate law taking seriously a mediating institution’s formulation of business communities, a virtue ethicsapproach can be integrated with a naturalist approach in a way that fosters ethical business behavior while mitigating the dangers of ingrouping tendencies. (shrink)

Explores moral progress in the American military.

Various reflections on the nature of consciousness, partly inspired by Alastair Hannay's views on the subject, are presented. In particular, its reality as a distinct non-physical existence is defended against such alternatives as have dominated philosophy for many years. The main difficulty in such a defense concerns the contingency it seems to imply as to the relations between consciousness and its expression in behaviour. But it only implies such contingency if some version of the Humean principle that there cannot be (...) necessary connections between distinct existences is assumed. It is more promising to see this relation as the falsification of this Humean principle and thus avoid what seems the main recommendation of behaviourism, functionalism etc. Some final reflections on the nature of the physical suggest that something like consciousness may be the noumenal essence of the physical in general. (shrink)

Bill Frederick’s work calls on business ethicists to consider religion as well as nature. Because there are naturally wired religious impulses in human beings and because of the fairness of including normative approaches meaningful for business people, Frederick suggests that the “R” in CSR4 should represent religion. This article takes up the theme in terms of the emerging field of naturalist theology, particularly (although embryonically) as stated by theologian Paul Tillich. Doing so creates (a) connections between “God as Life” and (...) nature and (b) linkages of the notions of symbol, culture, and transcendence. In addition to avoiding the socalled “naturalistic fallacy,” this integration can foster ethical business behavior. (shrink)

The disciplined investigation of consciousness is of three main types: eidetic, anthropological , and psychophysical. The first concerns the essence of consciousness in general and of its main modes. Its method involves introspection, empathy, and insight into necessities present in what these reveal. As the study of the essence of that which is the locus of all value it is of unique importance, and it is also essential as a foundation of the other inquiries. Such inquiry has been the main (...) task set for itself by phenomenology as a philosophical school, but engagement in it need not imply acceptance of distinctive doctrines of this school. English language?philosophy has developed in ways which discourage the eidetic investigation of consciousness, especially through insistence that modes of consciousness, conceived as a private possession, cannot be the referent of socially shared meanings. Its great mistake has been to expect ?consciousness? to refer to some elusive phenomenon to be looked for in the world and able to be studied as a distinctive reality only if conceptually isolable from what it reveals. Study of consciousness, however, is not primarily study of a phenomenon to be found within the world, but of the variety of ways in which the world can be present to us. (shrink)

The ArgumentHistorians of science naturally tend to express interest in other forms of intellectual activity only when these intersect with science. This tendncy has produced a number of enlightening studies of what happens when science and (for instance) law or theology come into contact, but little by way of how science enters into the calculations and social status of such forms of knowledge after the conjuction has passed. Recent work in the sociology of professions, in contrast, has focused attention precisely (...) on those moments when the expert knowledge produced by different group doesnotoverlap. This has been the contribution of Andrew Abbortt's theory of “jurisdictional boundaries” between competing professions. The case of Victorian actuaries who worked hard to maintain unique intellectual claims in the competitive life insurance industry while maintainiing strong social connections and overlaps in knowledge with organized science, challenges the way both historians of science and sociologists of professions view contending knowledge claims. By observing what motivated actuaries to forge an alliance with men of science in the 1820s, then tracing their gradual recognition of a need to distance themselves from certain of the “scientific” values that had earlier informed their collective identity, it is possible to make sense of connections as well as disconnections between science and other forms of knowledge. A history of quantification from the actuaries' perspective, in other words, allows us to view science bothasandincontext. (shrink)

One of the central debates among British chemists during the 1830s concerned the use of symbols to represent elements and compounds. Chemists such as Edward Turner, who desired to use symbolic notation mainly for practical reasons, eventually succeeded in fending off metaphysical objections to their approach. These objections were voiced both by the philosopher William Whewell, who wished to subordinate the chemists' practical aims to the rigid standard of algebra, and by John Dalton, whose hidebound opposition to abbreviated notation symbolized (...) the suspicion with which older British chemists perceived continental innovations. It is argued that the success of chemists like Turner in this debate reflects their larger success in the 1830s in achieving disciplinary autonomy and in beginning to align themselves more closely with prevailing chemical practice across the Channel. (shrink)

This study used fMRI to investigate the neural substrates of moral cognition in health resource allocation decision problems. In particular, it investigated the cognitive and emotional processes that underpin utilitarian approaches to health care rationing such as Quality Adjusted Life Years. Participants viewed hypothetical medical and nonmedical resource allocation scenarios which described equal or unequal allocation of resources to different groups. In addition, participants were assigned to 1 of 2 treatments in which they either did or did not receive advanced (...) instructions about the principles of utilitarianism. In all cases, participants were asked to judged the proposed allocations as “fair” or “unfair.” More brain activity was observed within the superior parietal lobe, angular gyrus, middle temporal gyrus, and bilateral caudate nucleus when participants viewed scenarios depicting equal divisions of resources. Conversely, unequal resource divisions were associated with more activity in the inferior frontal gyrus and insula cortex. Furthermore, instructions about the principles of utilitarianism led to significant activation differences within the inferior frontal gyrus and the middle frontal gyrus. Significant differences in activity were also found within the inferior frontal cortex and anterior insula between medical and nonmedical scenarios. The implications for cognitive control mechanisms and the cognitive and neural bases of utilitarian ethical judgment are discussed. (shrink)

This article considers the contribution that Hegel’s concept of “alienation” (Entfremdung) makes to his theory of reciprocal intersubjective recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit. I show that Hegel presents a powerful criticism of what I call the “automatic” model of recognition—I treat Stephen Darwall’s conception of reciprocal recognition as exemplary—where individuals merit recognition from others in virtue of some generic self-standing trait, and recognition requires responding appropriately to that feature. This model of recognition is alienating since it entails understanding the (...) self in a way that excludes the individual’s particularity. Overcoming alienation requires rejecting this automatic model in favor of an “achievement” model of recognition, where the individual’s particularity is understood to be essential to the achievement of self-imposed and socially-realized ends. (shrink)

Correspondences and similarities between ideas in shamanism and ideas in contemporary cognitive science are considered. The importance of interconnectedness in the web of life worldview characteristic of shamanism and in connectionist models of semantic memory in cognitive science, and the extension of meaning to elements of the natural world in shamanism and indistributed cognition, are considered. Cognitive consequences of such an extension (e.g., use of representativeness and intentional stance heuristics, magical thinking, social attribution errors, and social in‐group/out‐group differences) are discussed. (...) It is suggested that attributions of mental states, beliefs, and desires to a computer on the basis of behavioral measures (e.g., the Turing test) is consistent with the extension of meaning and intentionality to nonhuman elements of the natural world in shamanism. In general, the existence of such correspondencesand similarities suggests that elements of shamanism may reflect cognitive structures and processes that are also used by nonshamans and in nonshamanic settings. (shrink)

Properties of mental representation are related to findings in cognitive science and ideas in shamanism. A selective review of research in cognitive science suggests visual images and spatial memory preserve important functional information regarding physical principles and the behavior of objects in the natural world, and notions of second‐order isomorphism and the perceptual cycle developed to account for such findings are related to shamanic experience. Possible roles of implicit processes in shamanic cognition, and the idea that shamanic experience may involve (...) normally unconscious information becoming temporarily available to consciousness, are considered. The existence of a cognitive module dedicated to processing information relevant to social knowledge and social interaction is consistent with cognitive science and with shamanism, and may help account for the extension of intentionality and meaning that characterize shamanic practice. Overall, findings from cognitive science and ideas from shamanism exhibit a number of correspondences and similarities regarding basic properties of cognition, and this suggests that shamanic and nonshamanic cognition may not be fundamentally different. (shrink)

Just as Michael Porter's five forces provided a practical analytical tool for describing the forces that shape competitive strategy, so business ethicists ought to provide business leaders with a workable framework for understanding the sources of ethical obligations. The forces that shape competitive strategy vary according to time and industry, but are anchored in an ultimate criteria of profitability. Similarily, ethics can use a set of analytical categories that identify the relevant forces to business ethics on the basis of relationality.This (...) paper first argues that relationality based on naturalism is the primary, plausible value for ethics. Second, it adapts a tripartite dialectic from scholars William Frederick and Michael Novak to describe the relational categories with which business must contend. Third, it uses these forces in a way similar to Porter's competitive forces to offer an analytical language familiar to managers in order to characterize business ethics. (shrink)

When I perceive a physical object I am directly aware of something. This something may be called a sense?datum, leaving the question open whether it is indeed the physical object itself. Still, this question must be asked. It seems impossible that the sense?datum can be identical with the physical object for we do not always say we have different physical objects when we say we have different sense?data. On the other hand, the plain man does not think of the physical (...) object as something other than the sense?datum. It is suggested that the plain man regards the sense?datum as in a sense identical with the physical object he is perceiving. But it is a peculiar sense of ?identity? which is in question, one which does not conform to the rules logicians lay down for this word. (shrink)

What's going on? -- Integrity and trust -- Corporate dilemmas in the absence of integrity and trust -- Inspirational stories of integrity and trust -- Making good decisions about strategy, ethics, and leadership -- Building on good decisions with authenticity and sincerity -- Twelve ways to lead with the sincerity edge.